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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

There were a number of matters prepared to appear in this department
of the July issue of The Journal of Accountancy, but because of the
lack of space and the greater importance of the decision of the United States
supreme court in the case of La Belle Iron Works, we simply publish the
latter decision, as follows:
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 453—October Term, 1920.
La Belle Iron Works, Appellant,
Appeal from the Court
vs.
of Claims.
The United States.
[May 16, 1921.]
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court.
The court of claims dismissed appellant’s petition which claimed
a refund of $1,081,184.61, alleged to have been erroneously assessed
and exacted as an “excess profits tax” under title II of the revenue
act of 1917 (Act of October 3, 1917, Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 302, et seq.).
The case involves the construction and application of those provisions
by which the deduction from income, for the purposes of the tax, is
measured by the “invested capital” of the taxpayer; and a question is
raised as to the constitutionality of the act as construed and applied.
Title I of the act imposed “War Income Taxes” upon individuals
and corporations in addition to those imposed by Act of September 8,
1916 (Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756). Title II provided for the levying of
“War Excess Profits Taxes” upon corporations, partnerships, and
individuals. As applied to domestic corporations, the scheme of this
title was that, after providing for a deduction from income (sec. 203,
p. 304) equal to the same percentage of the invested capital for the
taxable year which the average amount of the annual net income of
the trade or business during the pre-war period (the years 1911, 1912,
and 1913) was of the invested capital for that period, but not less than
7 nor more than 9 per cent., plus $3,000, it imposed (sec. 201, p. 303),
in addition to other taxes, a graduated tax upon the net income beyond
the deduction, commencing with 20 per centum of such net income
above the deduction but not above 15 per centum of the invested
capital for the taxable year, and running as high as 60 per centum of
the net income in excess of 33 per centum of such capital. It applied
to “all trades or businesses,” with exceptions not now material (p. 303).
What should be deemed “invested capital” was defined by sec. 207
(p. 306), which, so far as pertinent, is set forth in a footnote on page 58.
The case was decided upon a demurrer to the petition, in which the
facts were stated as follows: Appellant is a domestic corporation and,
prior to the year 1904, acquired ore lands for which it paid the sum of
$190,000. Between that time and the year 1912 extensive explorations
and developments were carried on (the cost of which is not stated),
and it was proved that the lands contained large bodies of ore and
had an actual cash value not less than $10,105,400; and at all times
during the years 1912 to 1917, inclusive, their actual cash value was
not less than the sum last mentioned. In the year 1912 the company
increased the valuation of said lands upon its books by adding thereto
the sum of $10,000,000, which it carried to surplus, and thereupon, in
the same year, declared a stock dividend in the sum of $9,915,400,
representing the increase in value of the ore lands. Theretofore appel
lant’s capital stock had consisted of shares issued, all of one class,
having a par value of $9,915,400. The declaration of the stock dividend
was carried out by the surrender to the company of all the outstanding
stock, and its cancelation, and the exchange of one share of new
common and one share of new preferred stock for each share of the
original stock.
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In returning its annual net income for the year 1917 the company
stated its invested capital to be $26,322,904.14, in which was included
the sum of $10,105,400 as representing the value of its ore lands. The
commissioner of internal revenue caused a re-assessment to be made,
based upon a reduction of the invested capital to $16,407,507.14; the
difference ($9,915,400) being the increase in the value of the ore lands
already mentioned. The result was an additional tax of $1,081,184.61,
which, having been paid, was made the subject of a claim for refund;
and this having been considered and rejected by the commissioner,
there followed a suit in the court of claims, with the result already
mentioned.
Appellant’s contentions, in brief, are, first, that the increased value
of the ore lands, placed upon the company’s books in 1912, ought to be
included in invested capital under sec. 207 (a) (3), as “paid in or
earned surplus and undivided profits.” Second, that within the mean
ing of clause (2), which provides that invested capital shall include
“the actual cash value of tangible property paid in other than cash,
for stock or shares in such corporation,” the stock of the company
issued in 1912, consisting of $9,915,400 of preferred stock and an
equal amount of common, was fully paid for: either (a) by the tan
gible assets, including the ore properties at their increased value, or
(b) by the surrender of all the certificates representing the old com
mon stock, which, it is said, had an actual cash value equal to double
its par. And, third, that the construction put upon the act by the
treasury department, based as it is said not upon value but upon the
single feature of cost, disregarding the time of acquisition, would
render the act unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without
due process under the fifth amendment, because so arbitrary as to
amount in effect to confiscation; and hence that this construction must
be avoided.
Reading the entire language of section 207 in the light of the cir
cumstances that surrounded the passage of the act, we think its mean
ing as to “invested capital” is entirely clear. The great war in
Europe had been in progress since the year 1914, and the manufacture
and export of war supplies and other material for the belligerent
powers had stimulated many lines of trade and business in this
country, resulting in large profits as compared with the period before
the war, and as compared with ordinary returns upon the capital
embarked. The United States had become directly involved in the
conflict in the spring of 1917, necessitating heavy increases in taxa
tion; at the same time manufactures and trade of every description
were rendered even more active, and in certain lines more profitable,
than before, so that the unusual gains derived therefrom formed a
natural subject for special taxation.
On the eve of our entry, and in order to provide a “Special Pre
paredness Fund” for army, navy, and fortification purposes, an Act
(March 3, 1917; Ch. 159, 39 Stat. 1000) was passed, which, in title II,
provided for an excess-profits tax on corporations and partnerships
equal to 8 per centum of the amount by which their net income ex
ceeded $5,000 plus 8 per centum of the “actual capital invested”; and,
in sec. 202 (p. 1001), defined this term to mean “(1) actual cash paid
in, (2) the actual cash value, at the time of payment, of assets other
than cash paid in, and (3) paid in or earned surplus and undivided
profits used or employed in the business,” but not to include money or
other property borrowed.
The revenue act of October 3, 1917, passed after we had become
engaged in the war, took the place of the act of March 3, and embodied
a “War Excess Profits Tax,” with higher percentages imposed upon
the income in excess of deductions and a more particular definition of
terms. A scrutiny of the particular provisions of Section 207 shows
that it was the dominant purpose of congress to place the peculiar bur
den of this tax upon the income of trades and businesses exceeding
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what was deemed a normally reasonable return upon the capital actu
ally embarked. But if such capital were to be computed according to
appreciated market values based upon the estimates of interested
parties (on whose returns perforce the government must in great part
rely), exaggerations would be at a premium, corrections difficult, and
the tax easily evaded. Section 207 shows that congress was fully
alive to this and designedly adopted a term—“invested capital”—and
a definition of it, that would measurably guard against inflated valua
tions. The word “invested” in itself imports a restrictive qualification.
When speaking of the capital of a business corporation or partnership,
such as the act deals with, “to invest” imports a laying out of money,
or money’s worth, either by an individual in acquiring an interest in
the concern with a view to obtaining income or profit from the con
duct of its business, or by the concern itself in acquiring something of
permanent use in the business; in either case involving a conversion
of wealth from one form into another suitable for employment in the
making of the hoped-for gains. See Webster’s New Internal. Diet.
“invest,” 8; Century Diet., “invest,” 7; Standard Diet., “invest,” 1.
In order to adhere to this restricted meaning and avoid exaggerated
valuations, the draftsman of the act resorted to the test of including
nothing but money, or money’s worth, actually contributed or con
verted in exchange for shares of the capital stock, or actually acquired
through the business activities of the corporation or partnership (in
volving again a conversion) and coming in ab extra, by way of increase
over the original capital stock. How consistently this was carried out
becomes evident as the section is examined in detail. Cash paid in,
and tangible property paid in other than cash, are confined to such
as were contributed for stock or shares in the corporation or partner
ship; and the property is to be taken at its actual cash value “at the
time of such payment”—distinctly negativing any allowance for appre
ciation in value. There is but a single exception: tangible property
paid in prior to January 1, 1914, may be taken at its actual cash value
on that date, but in no case exceeding the par value of the original
stock or shares specifically issued for it; a restriction in itself requiring
the valuation to be taken as of a date prior to the war period, and in
no case to exceed the stock valuation placed upon it at the time it
was contributed. The provision of clause (3) that includes “paid in
or earned surplus and undivided profits used or employed in the
business” recognizes that in some cases contributions are received
from stockholders in money or its equivalent for the specific purpose
of creating an actual excess capital over and above the par value of
the stock; and, in view of the context, surplus “earned” as well as that
“paid in” excludes the idea of capitalizing (for the purposes of this
tax) a mere appreciation of values over cost.
The same controlling thought is carried into the proviso, which
relates to the valuation of patents, copyrights, trade-marks, goodwill,
franchises, and similar intangible property. Every line shows evi
dence of a legislative purpose to confine the account to such items as
were paid in for stock or shares, and to their values “at the time of
such payment;” but, with regard to those bona fide purchased prior to
March 3, 1917, there is a special provision, limiting the effect of any
adjustments that might have been made in view of the provisions of
the act of that date.
It is clear that clauses (1) and (2) refer to actual contributions of
cash or of tangible property at its cash value contributed in exchange
for stock or shares specifically issued for it; and that neither these
clauses, nor clause (3) which relates to surplus, can be construed as
including within the definition of invested capital any marking up of
the valuation of assets upon the books to correspond with increase in
market value, or any paper transaction by which new shares are issued
in exchange for old ones in the same corporation, but which is not
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in substance and effect a new acquisition of capital property by the
company.
.
It is clear enough that congress adopted the basis of invested
capital” measured according to actual contributions made for stock or
shares and actual accessions in the way of surplus, valuing them
according to actual and bona fide transactions and by valuations ob
taining at the time of acquisition, not only in order to confine the
capital, the income from which was to be in part exempted from the
burden of this special tax, to something approximately representative
of the risks accepted by the investors in embarking their means in the
enterprise, but also in order to adopt tests that would enable returns
to be more easily checked by examination of records, and make them
less liable to inflation than if a more liberal meaning of “capital and
surplus” had been adopted; thus avoiding the necessity of employing
a special corps of valuation experts to grapple with the many difficult
problems that would have ensued had general market values been
adopted as the criteria.
In view of the special language employed in section 207, obviously
for the purpose of avoiding appreciated valuations of assets over and
above cost, the argument that such value is as real as cost value, and
that in the terminology of corporation and partnership accounting
“capital and surplus” mean merely the excess of all assets at actual
values over outstanding liabilities, and “surplus” means the intrinsic
value of all assets over and above outstanding liabilities plus par of
the stock, is beside the mark. Nor has the distinction between capital
and income, discussed in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 187;
Hays v. Gauley Mtn. Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189, 193; and Southern Pacific Co.
v. Lowe, 247 U. S., 330, 334-335, any proper bearing upon the questions
here presented.
Upon the strength of an administrative interpretation contained in
a treasury regulation pertaining to the revenue act of 1917, under
which “stocks” were to be regarded as tangible property when paid in
for stock or shares of a corporation, it is insisted that appellant’s
stock dividend distribution of 1912 ought to be treated as paid for in
tangible property, the old stock surrendered being regarded as tan
gible for the purpose. But that distribution, in substance and effect,
was an internal transaction, in which the company received nothing
from the stockholders any more than they received anything from it
(see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 210-211) ; and the old shares
cannot be regarded as having been “paid in for” the new ones within
the meaning of section 207 (a) (2), even were they “stocks” within the
meaning of that regulation, which is doubtful.
It is said that the admitted increase in the value of appellant’s ore
lands is properly to be characterized as earned surplus, because it was
the result of extensive exploration and development work. We assume
that a proper sum, not exceeding the cost of the work, might have
been added to earned surplus on that account; but none such was
stated in appellant’s petition, nor, so far as appears, in its return of
income. In the absence of such a showing it was not improper to
attribute the entire $9,915,400, added to the book value of the ore
property in the year 1912, to a mere appreciation in the value of the
property; in short, to what is commonly known as the “unearned
increment,” not properly “earned surplus” within the meaning of the
statute.
The foregoing considerations dispose of the contention that either
the increased value of appellant’s ore lands, or the surrender of the
old stock in exchange for the new issues based upon that value, can
be regarded as “tangible property paid in other than cash, for stock
or shares in such corporation” within the meaning of sec 207 (a) (2);
and of the further contention that such increased value can properly
be regarded as “paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits” under
sec. 207 (a) (3).
56

Income-tax Department
It is urged that this construction, defining invested capital according
to the original cost of the property instead of its present value, has the
effect of rendering the act “glaringly unequal” and of doubtful con
stitutionality; the insistence being that, so construed, it operates to
produce baseless and arbitrary discriminations, to the extent of render
ing the tax invalid under the due-process-of-law clause of the fifth
amendment. Reference is made to cases decided under the equal-pro
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment (Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene,
216 U. S. 400, 418; Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S.
55); but clearly they are not in point. The fifth amendment has no
equal-protection clause; and the only rule of uniformity prescribed
with respect to duties, imposts, and excises laid by congress is the
territorial uniformity required by Art. I, sec. 8. Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 557; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41,
98, 196; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220, U. S. 107, 150; Billings v. United
States, 232 U. S. 261, 282; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U. S.
1, 24. That the statute under consideration operates with territorial
uniformity is obvious and not questioned.
Appellant cites Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 188, and Inter
national Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 145, but these cases
also are inapplicable, being based upon the due-process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, with which state taxing laws were held in
conflict because they had the effect of imposing taxes on the property
of foreign corporations located and used beyond the jurisdiction of the
taxing state. There is no such infirmity here.
Nor can we regard the act—in basing “invested capital” upon
actual costs to the exclusion of higher estimated values—as productive
of arbitrary discriminations raising a doubt about its constitutionality
under the due-process clause of the fifth amendment. The difficulty
of adjusting any system of taxation so as to render it precisely equal
in its bearing is proverbial, and such nicety is not even required of
the states under the equal-protection clause, much less of congress
under the more general requirement of due process of law in taxation.
Of course it will be understood that congress has very ample authority
to adjust its income taxes according to its discretion, within the bounds
of geographical uniformity. Courts have no authority to pass upon
the propriety of its measures; and we deal with the present criticism
only for the purpose of refuting the contention, strongly urged, that
the tax is so wholly arbitrary as to amount to confiscation.
The act treats all corporations and partnerships alike, so far as
they are similarly circumstanced. As to one and all, congress adjusted
this tax, generally speaking, on the basis of excluding from its opera
tion income to the extent of a specified percentage (7 to 9 per cent.)
of the capital employed, but upon condition that such capital be valued
according to what actually was embarked at the outset or added
thereafter, disregarding any appreciation in values. If in its applica
tion the tax in particular instances may seem to bear upon one cor
poration more than upon another, this is due to differences in their
circumstances, not to any uncertainty or want of generality in the
tests applied.
Minor distinctions—such as those turning upon the particular dates
of January 1, 1914, and March 3, 1917—are easily explained, as we
have seen. The principal line of demarcation—that based upon actual
costs, excluding estimated appreciation—finds reasonable support up
on grounds of both theory and practice, in addition to the important
consideration of convenience in administration, already adverted to.
There is a logical incongruity in entering upon the books of a cor
poration as the capital value of property acquired for permanent em
ployment in its business and still retained for that purpose, a sum
corresponding not to its cost but to what probably might be realized
by sale in the market. It is not merely that the market value has
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not been realized or tested by sale made, but that sale cannot be
made without abandoning the very purpose for which the property
is held, involving a withdrawal from business so far as that particular
property is concerned. Whether in a given case property should be
carried in the capital account at market value rather than at cost
may be a matter of judgment, depending upon special circumstances
and the local law. But certainly congress, in seeking a general rule,
reasonably might adopt the cost basis, resting upon experience rather
than anticipation.
In organizing corporations, it is not unusual to issue different
classes of securities, with various priorities as between themselves,
to represent different kinds of contribution to capital. In exchange
for cash, bonds may be issued; for fixed properties, like plant and
equipment, preferred stock may be given; while more speculative
values, like goodwill or patent rights, may be represented by common
stock. In the present case, for instance, when appellant took the esti
mated increase in value of its ore lands as a basis for increased capi
talization, it issued preferred stock to the amount of the former total,
carrying those lands at cost, and issued a like amount of common
stock to represent the appreciation in their market value. It does
not appear that in form the new issues were thus allocated; but at
least there was a recognition of a higher claim in favor of one part
of the book capital than of the other. Upon like grounds, it was not
unreasonable for congress, in adjusting the “excess profits tax,” to
accord preferential treatment to capital representing actual invest
ments, as compared with capital representing higher valuations based
upon estimates, however confident and reliable, of what probably could
be realized were the property sold instead of retained.
From every point of view, the tax in question must be sustained.
We intimate no opinion upon the effect of the act with respect to
deductions from cost values of capital assets because of depreciation
or the like; no question of that kind being here involved.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds concurs in the result.
*Sec. 207. That as used in this title, the term “invested capital” for any year
means the average invested capital for the year, as defined and limited in this title,
averaged monthly.
As used in this title “invested capital” does not include stocks, bonds (other than
obligations of the United States), or other assets, the income from which is not
subject to the tax imposed by this title, nor money or other property borrowed, and
means, subject to the above limitations:
(a) In the case of a corporation or partnership: (1) Actual cash paid in, (2) the
actual cash value of tangible property paid in other than cash, for stock or shares in
such corporation or partnership, at the time of such payment (but in case such
tangible property was paid in prior to January first, nineteen hundred and fourteen,
the actual cash value of such property as of January first, nineteen hundred and four
teen, but in no case to exceed the par value of the original stock or shares specifically
issued therefor), and (3) paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits used or
employed in the business, exclusive of undivided profits earned during the taxable
year: Provided, That (a) the actual cash value of patents and copyrights paid in for
stock or shares in such corporation or partnership, at the time of such payment, shall
be included as invested capital, but not to exceed the par value of such stock or shares
at the time of such payment, and (b) the goodwill, trade-marks, trade brands, the
franchise of a corporation or partnership, or other intangible property, shall be in
cluded as invested capital if the corporation or partnership made payment bona fide
therefor specifically as such in cash or tangible property, the value of such goodwill,
trade-mark, trade brand, franchise, or intangible property, not to exceed the actual
cash or actual cash value of the tangible property paid therefor at the time of such
payment; but goodwill, trade-marks, trade brands, franchise of a corporation or part
nership, or other intangible property, bona fide purchased, prior to March third,
nineteen hundred and seventeen, for and with interests or shares in a partnership or
for and with shares in the capital stock of a corporation (issued prior to March third,
nineteen hundred and seventeen), in an amount not to exceed, on March third, nine
teen hundred and seventeen, twenty per centum of the total interests or shares in the
partnership or of the total shares of the capital stock of the corporation, shall be
included in invested capital at a value not to exceed the actual cash value at the time
of such purchase, and in case of issue of stock therefor not to exceed the par value
of such stock;
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